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"March Madness": An Examination of
Dual-Use Trademark Terms and Reverse
Confusion
by
DAVID Y. GAN*
Introduction
The Seventh Circuit's recent decision in Illinois High School
Ass'n v. GTE Vantage Inc.' ("IHSA v. GTE"), has been called the
"case of the year" in trademark law.2 In IHSA v. GTE, Chief Judge
Richard Posner stated that "for the sake of protecting effective
communication, ' 3  plaintiff Illinois High School Association's
("IHSA") trademark infringement claim against defendant GTE
Vantage, a licensee of the National Collegiate Athletic Association
("NCAA"), must fail because IHSA's trademark, "March Madness,"
had become a "dual-use" term.4 By "dual-use," Judge Posner meant
that "March Madness" had become associated by a certain portion of
the public with the NCAA, while another portion of the public still
associated "March Madness" with IHSA.5 IHSA had no remedy for
* J.D. Candidate, 1999, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.S.
1996, University of California, San Diego. I wish to thank Professor Margreth Barrett for
her comments on an earlier draft of this Note. This Note is dedicated to my parents,
Sonny and Lena Gan.
1. 99 F.3d 244 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1083 (1997).
2. Jeffrey B. Samuels & Linda B. Samuels, Recent Developments in Trademark Law
and Practice, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 181, 182 (1997). See also Recent
Case, 19 No.2 ENT. L. REP. 12 (1997) (noting that the IHSA case took principles
governing dual-use terms "a significant step further").
3. IHSA, 99 F.3d at 247.
4. Id.
5. See id, This definition of "dual-use" differs from Professor McCarthy's. McCarthy
defines a term of "dual-usage" as one that is "generic to some portion of the market and a
trademark to another class of consumers." 2 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 12:51 (4th ed. 1996). Here, Judge Posner stated that "March Madness"
had not become generic, i.e. the court did not contend that "March Madness" had come to
describe basketball tournaments or any other event in general. See IHSA, 99 F.3d at 247.
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the loss of its trademark even though its trademark had not become a
generic term.6 With generic terms, the public's interest in "effective
communication" outweighs the trademark owner's interest in
protection for his mark.7
The Lanham Act8 governs federal trademark protection. 9 The
standard for finding trademark infringement under the Lanham Act
is whether the alleged infringement causes a "likelihood of
confusion," as to the origin of goods or services among the relevant
class of consumers.10 The essence of trademark law, then, is to
prevent consumer confusion." Accordingly, it is not the trademark
itself that is infringed; rather it is the right of the public to be free
from confusion and the synonymous right of the trademark owner to
control the product's reputation.'2
The typical trademark infringement case is one of "forward
confusion," where a junior user13 attempts to capitalize on a senior
user's established trademark reputation by suggesting that the junior
user's product comes from the same source as the senior user's
product.14  IHSA, however, relied primarily on the "reverse
For a discussion of generic terms, see infra Part 1(A).
6. A generic term is one which describes the genus or class of a thing. 1 J. GILSON,
TRADEMARK PROTEMCION AND PRACrICE § 2.02 (1998).
7. See Robert N. Kravitz, Trademarks, Speech, and the Gay Olympics Case, 69 B.U.
L. REV. 131, 136 (stating that generic terms may not be used as trademarks to prevent
trademark law from "severely intruding" on others' freedom of expression). Also, giving
trademark protection to generic terms would be in effect granting the trademark owner a
monopoly, since competitors could not describe their goods as what they are. See 2
MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 12:2.
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994). The Lanham Act is the popular name for the
Trademark Act of 1946. See 1 GILSON, supra note 6, § 1.01(3) n.20.
9. See 1 GIISON, supra note 6, § 1.04(1).
10. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act states:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation
of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as the affiliation,
connection, or association.., shall be liable.
The likelihood of confusion test applies to both federal statutory and common-law
trademark infringement. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 23:1.
11. See Kravitz, supra note 7, at 135; see also Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as
Speech." Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for Protection of the Trade
Symbols, 1982 WIs. L. REv. 158, 160 (1982) ("The concept of consumer confusion is...
the touchstone of traditional trademark theory.").
12. See James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th Cir.
1976).
13. A junior user is one who employs a trademark after the first, or senior user.
14. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 23:10.
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confusion" theory.15 Reverse confusion typically occurs when a large
junior user "saturates the market" with a trademark that is
confusingly similar or identical to that of a smaller, senior user.16 This
causes the public to assume that the senior user's products are either
really the junior user's product or that the former is somehow
connected to the latter.17
This Note examines the holding of IHSA v. GTE, that dual-use
terms should be treated in the same manner as generic terms, and
thus receive no protection under reverse confusion or any other
theory of trademark protection, for the sake of "effective
communication."' 8 This Note argues that a broad rule assimilating
dual-use terms to generic terms is not consistent with the goals of
trademark protection and the Lanham Act. Further, a successful
reverse confusion infringement will inevitably create a dual-use term
such that some portion of the public will associate the mark with the
larger junior user while another portion of the public will still
associate the mark with the senior user. By eliminating protection for
dual-use terms, the rule of IHSA v. GTE potentially eliminates
protection against reverse confusion infringement.
Part I of this Note examines the goals and conflicting interests of
trademark protection under the Lanham Act. Part II briefly
summarizes traditional trademark infringement analysis. Part III
traces the development of the reverse confusion doctrine and
provides examples of the typical pattern of reverse confusion. Part
IV examines the facts and holding of IHSA v. GTE. Finally, in Part
V this Note suggests that dual-use terms should be protectable
trademarks, and that this treatment of dual-use terms would better
serve the underlying goals and conflicting equitable considerations of
trademark protection.
I. Goals of Trademark Protection
The use of trademarks began at least 3,500 years ago, when
potters' marks were used to identify the source of fired clay pots.
Through the mark, the public could identify the potter with the
quality of his craftsmanship. 19  Professor Gilson identifies the
following possible functions of trademarks: (a) designating the source
or origin of the product; (b) symbolizing a particular standard of
15. IHSA v. GTE, 99 F.3d 244,246 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1083 (1997).
For an in-depth discussion of reverse confusion, see infra Part III.
16. Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 957 (7th Cir. 1992).
17. See Ameritech, Inc. v. American Info. Tech. Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 964 (6th Cir.
1987).
18. IHSA, 99 F.3d at 247.
19. 1 GILsON, supra note 6, § 1.01(1).
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quality; (c) identifying a product and distinguishing it from the
products of others; (d) symbolizing the goodwill of the trademark
owner and motivating consumers to purchase the product; (e)
representing a substantial advertising investment; and (f) protecting
the public from confusion and deception.20  For consumers,
trademarks protect the freedom of choice by preventing confusion or
deceit from an array of similarly trademarked products.21 Modem
"consumer-minded" courts have emphasized the goal of protecting
consumers from confusion.22
The basic federal trademark statute is the Lanham Act.3
Congress intended the Lanham Act to provide primarily two
protections.24 First, the Lanham Act protects consumers, assuring
that purchasers will receive the expected product when buying a
product bearing a particular trademark.25 Second, the statute protects
trademark owners, who have expended time and resources in the
trademark, from misappropriation by other users.26 The Lanham
Act's "likelihood of confusion" standard for trademark infringement
serves to protect both enumerated Congressional interests.27
Restrictions on "commercial speech," including trademarks,
were long thought to be exempt from constitutional scrutiny.28
However, in 1976 the United States Supreme Court held for the first
time that commercial speech deserves protection under the free
20. Id. § 1.03(1).
21. See id. § 1.03(5)(b). The confusion to be considered is that among the relevant
class of consumers as to the source of the good or service. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, §
23:5.
22. See 1 GILSON, supra note 6, § 1.03(8)(a). See, e.g., James Burrough, Ltd. v. Sign of
Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th Cir. 1976) ("In the consideration of evidence
relating to trademark infringement, therefore, a court must expand the more frequent,
one-on-one, contest-between-two sides, approach. A third party, the consuming public, is
present, and its interests are paramount."); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Metropolitan Ins.
Co., 277 F.2d 896, 900-01 (7th Cir. 1960) ("However, the paramount concern of the courts
is the protection of the public interest. To this end the courts have a duty to invoke their
equitable powers to restrain such an invasion on the part of defendant. Otherwise, the
likelihood of the commission of a fraud on the public is ever present; and this should be
enjoined, unintentional though it may be."). The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "the
infringer deprives consumers of their ability to distinguish among the goods of competing
manufacturers." Inwood Labs, Inc. v. Ives Labs, Inc., 456 U.S. 844,854 n.14 (1982).
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994).
24. See S. REP. No. 1333, at 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275.
25. See id.; Hal Fullmer, Recent Decision, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 601, 606 (1996)
(reiterating that one goal is to protect the "public confidence").
26. See id.
27. See Fullmer, supra note 25, at 607 ("[T]o ensure that its goals were being
implemented properly, Congress has amended the Lanham Act so that the likelihood of
confusion standard could be construed more expansively.").
28. Denicola, supra note 11, at 159.
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speech clause of the First Amendment.29 However, commercial
speech is entitled to limited First Amendment protection.30 For
example, restrictions on misleading or untruthful commercial speech
are not barred by the First Amendment.31 Since prevention of
consumer confusion and deception is at the core of trademark law,
most trademark actions are shielded from First Amendment
challenges.32 Another buffer between trademark law and the First
Amendment is that trademarks may not be granted for generic
terms,33 a rule which strikes a balance between protection of freedom
of expression and protection of the rights of creators of intellectual
property.M
In summary, trademark protection serves to safeguard the public
from deceit and confusion, to foster fair competition, and to secure to
the trademark owner the advantages of reputation and goodwill by
preventing their diversion from the creator of the mark.35 Further,
since the public interest in preventing consumer confusion is at the
heart of trademark law, there are usually no serious First
Amendment problems in granting trademark protection.3 6
H. Traditional Trademark Infringement Analysis
In an action for trademark infringement, the plaintiff must prove
two elements.' The plaintiff must first show that there is a mark that
merits protection.38 This showing depends in part on the category of
29. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748,770 (1976).
30. 4 McCARTHY, supra note 5, § 31:141.
31. See id. § 31.140; Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 415 U.S. at 771-72 (government may
insure "that the stream of commercial information flow cleanly as well as freely").
32. Kravitz, supra note 7, at 135; see also Denicola, supra note 11, at 159 (Traditional
trademark theory, "with its historic emphasis on consumer deception and confusion, thus
rests comfortably within contemporary constitutional principles.")
33. For a definition of generic terms, see infra Part II(A).
34. See Kravitz, supra note 7, at 136 (expressing that the "generic word defense in
trademark law is closely analogous to idea/expression dichotomy in copyright" law).
35. S. REP. No. 1333, supra note 24, at 3.
36. However, commentators have argued that this traditional model of trademark
analysis does not provide enough First Amendment protections. See, e.g., Wendy J.
Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural
Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE LJ. 1533 (concluding that under a natural rights
theory of intellectual property, courts should be providing more First Amendment
protection in intellectual property cases).
37. A third showing that the plaintiff must make is that the plaintiff owns the mark.
Opticians Ass'n. of Am. v. Independent Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187, 192 (3d Cir.
1990). In IHSA v. GTE, it is undisputed that IHSA owns the "March Madness" mark and
has been using it for over fifty years. 99 F.3d 244,245 (7th Cir. 1996).
38. See, e.g., Banff, Ltd. v. Federated Dep't Stores, 841 F.2d 486,489 (2d Cir. 1988).
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distinctiveness into which the court places the plaintiff's mark 39
Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate a "likelihood of confusion,"
by proving "that an appreciable number of ordinarily prudent
purchasers are likely to be misled, or indeed simply confused, as to
the source of the goods in question. '40
A. Protectability of Plaintiff's Mark
Trademarks are usually classified into the following categories, in
order of increasing distinctiveness: (1) generic; (2) descriptive; (3)
suggestive; (4) arbitrary; or (5) fanciful.41 The latter three categories,
suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful marks, are deemed inherently
distinctive and are entitled to trademark protection.42
At the other end of the spectrum, generic terms cannot be taken
out of the public domain and are not protectable as trademarks.43 A
generic term describes the genus or class of a thing. The generic term
answers the question, "what is it?"44  For example, the term
"thermos" is a generic term denoting vacuum bottles in general,
instead of a trademark denoting products from a particular source.45
B. Likelihood of Confusion
If the plaintiff's mark is entitled to protection, the second step is
for the plaintiff to show a "likelihood of confusion." Each circuit has
its own, similar, multi-factor test for likelihood of confusion. For
example, the Third Circuit has identified factors such as similarity
between the marks, evidence of actual confusion, and whether the
product is marketed through the same channels of trade and
advertised in the same media.46  Once a trademark owner
39. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992); see also infra Part
II(A) (discussing the categories of distinctiveness).
40. Banff, 841 F.2d at 489 (quoting Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580
F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978); see also Harlem Wizards Entertainment Basketball, Inc. v. NBA
Properties, Inc. 952 F. Supp. 1084, 1094 (D.NJ. 1997) ("Likelihood of confusion exists if
the consuming public assumes upon viewing a mark that the product or service
represented by the mark is associated with a different product or service represented by a
similar mark.").
41. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768.
42. See il
43. In addition, descriptive marks which merely describe a product are not protectable
unless they have achieved a distinctive secondary meaning. See id at 769.
44. 1 GIOON, supra note 6, § 2.02.
45. See King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577, 580 (2d Cir. 1963);
see also Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (holding that "aspirin"
is a generic term); Dupont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prod. Co., 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1936)
(holding that "cellophane" is a generic term).
46. The Third Circuit has identified ten factors for the trial court to consider in
determining likelihood of confusion: (1) degree of similarity between the marks; (2)
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demonstrates that its mark is legally protectable and there is a
likelihood of confusion, the owner is entitled to relief based on
trademark infringement.47
M. Development of the Reverse Confusion Doctrine
A. Reverse Confusion: History and Principles
The reverse confusion doctrine was first alluded to in 1918 by
Justice Holmes, in his concurring opinion in International News
Service v. Associated Press.48
The ordinary case, I say, is palming off the defendant's product as
the plaintiff's, but the same evil may follow from the opposite
falsehood-from saying ... that the plaintiffs product is the
defendant's .... The falsehood is a little more subtle, the injury a
little more indirect... but I think that the principle that condemns
the one condemns the other.49
In the typical reverse confusion scenario, the first or senior user,
generally a small business, adopts and uses a trademark in a certain
geographic area or product market.50 The mark is then adopted by a
more powerful junior user, which may cause the public to believe that
the senior user is actually the junior user, or that the senior user's
products "somehow emanate from those of the junior user."' The
junior user in this situation is not a "free rider" and does not seek to
profit from the goodwill associated with the senior user's trademark.52
strength of the mark; (3) the care and attention expected of consumers purchasing the
product; (4) length of time defendant has used the mark without evidence of actual
confusion arising; (5) intent of defendant; (6) evidence of actual confusion; (7) whether the
product is marketed though the same channels of trade and advertised in the same media;
(8) the extent to which the targets of the parties' sales efforts are the same; (9) the
relationship of the products in the minds of consumers because of similarity of function;
and (10) other factors suggesting that the consuming public might expect the senior user to
manufacture a product in the defendant's market, or that the senior user is likely to
expand into that market. See Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir.
1983); Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold Inc., 589 F.2d 1225,1229 (3d Cir. 1978).
47. See Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 466,473 (3d Cir. 1994).
A greater showing may be necessary to obtain monetary, instead of injunctive, relief. 4
MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 30:58.
48. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
49. let at 247 (Holmes, J., concurring).
50. See Fullmer, supra note 25, at 602.
51. Molly S. Cusson, Note, Reverse Confusion" Modifying the Polaroid Factors to
Achieve Consistent Results, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 179, 182
(1995); see also 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 23:1 (actions of the junior user causing
confusion about the origin of the goods or services).
52. See Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 957 (7th Cir.
1992); 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 23:10 (suggesting that the junior user in reverse
confusion scenario is not taking a "free ride" on the senior's goodwill).
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The senior user is nevertheless injured "because the senior user loses
the value of the trademark-its product identity, corporate identity,
control over its goodwill and reputation, and ability to move into new
markets."53
The Tenth Circuit was the first circuit court to recognize the
reverse confusion doctrine in Big 0 Tire Dealers v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co.54  Since that time, every circuit court which has
considered the reverse confusion doctrine, i.e. that reverse confusion
can satisfy the likelihood of confusion requirement for trademark
infringement, has accepted the doctrine.55
The courts have come to accept reverse confusion because of
concerns regarding large "bully" companies who have the financial
ability to promote marks taken from smaller competitors.5 6 The
rationale for protecting the senior user in a reverse confusion scenario
is "especially compelling" because with the junior user saturating the
market with advertising, the senior user may be seen by the public as
the infringer.57 The protection afforded the senior user in this
scenario is consistent with the goals of trademark protection,
including protection of the senior user's goodwill and prevention of
public confusion.5 8 As the Tenth Circuit stated:
The logical consequence of accepting [defendant's position that
reverse confusion is not actionable] would be the immunization
from unfair competition liability of a company with a well
established trade name and with the economic power to advertise
extensively for a product name taken from a competitor. If the law
is to limit recovery.., anyone with adequate size and resources can
adopt any trademark and develop a new meaning for that trademark
as identification of the second user's products. The activities of [the
defendant] are unquestionably unfair competition through an
improper use of a trademark and that must be actionable.59
B. Reverse Confusion: Examples
The two examples given below demonstrate the typical pattern
of reverse confusion, where a larger, economically stronger junior
user appropriates the senior user's trademark, damaging the senior
user's goodwill in the mark and its future ability to expand into other
53. Ameritech, Inc. v. American Info. Tech. Corp., 811 F.2d 960,964 (6th Cir. 1987).
54. 561 F.2d 1365, 1372 (10th Cir. 1977).
55. See Dream Team Collectibles, Inc. v. NBA Properties, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1401,
1408 (E.D. Mo. 1997). See generally Thad G. Long & Alfred M. Marks, Reverse
Confusion: Fundamentals and Limits, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 1, 4 n.7 (1994).
56. See Long & Marks, supra note 55, at 10.
57. Sands, Taylor & Wood, 978 F.2d at 958.
58. See id.
59. Big 0 Tire Dealers v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365, 1372 (10th Cir.
1977) (emphasis added).
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(1) Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
In the "Bigfoot" case, plaintiff Big 0 Tire Dealers ("Big 0")
brought a trademark infringement action against defendant
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. ("Goodyear"), including a claim of
reverse confusion.6° Big 0 is a tire-buying organization that had
approximately two hundred independent retail tire dealers in
fourteen states that identified themselves to the public as "Big 0"
dealers.61 The dealers sell Big 0 private label tires, as well as other
companies' brands.62 Big O's net worth at the time of trial was
approximately two hundred thousand dollars.63 Goodyear, on the
other hand, was the world's largest tire manufacturer and had a net
income of over $157 million per year.64
In February, 1974, Big 0 began selling "Big 0 Big Foot" tires to
the public.65 Shortly thereafter, Goodyear decided to use the term
"Bigfoot" to promote its new line of tires.66 Over Big O's objections,
Goodyear launched a nationwide campaign in September of 1974,
and spent over $9.5 million within a month and a half of beginning
this massive advertising campaign. 67 The Tenth Circuit recognized
Big O's reverse confusion claim and upheld awards against Goodyear
for compensatory and punitive damages.68
(2) Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co.
In the "Thirst-Aid" case, the Seventh Circuit addressed and
recognized the doctrine of reverse confusion.69 Plaintiff Sands, Taylor
& Wood Co. ("STW") was a small, Vermont-based company that
owned the trademark "Thirst-Aid," which it used for soft drinks, soda
fountain syrups, and ice cream toppings.70 In the late 1970s, STW
test-marketed a new "Thirst-Aid" isotonic beverage7' which would
60. See id. at 1371.
61. See id at 1367.
62. See id
63. See id
64. See id.
65. See id. at 1367-68.
66. See id at 1368.
67. See id!
68. See idt at 1371-72, 1375-76 (compensatory damages not to exceed $678,302, and
punitive damages set at $4,069,812).
69. See Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1992).
70. See id. at 949.
71. An isotonic beverage is one which is "specifically formulated to replenish fluids
and minerals lost by the human body, particularly through strenuous exercise." Id. at 949
n.1.
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compete with Defendant's Gatorade brand isotonic beverage.72
Although the project was fairly successful, it did not go forward.73
Defendant then began a large advertising campaign for its Gatorade
brand beverage using the slogan "Gatorade is Thirst-Aid, for that
deep-down body thirst."74 In finding for STW on a theory of reverse
confusion, the court emphasized, among other factors, the intent of
STW to re-enter the isotonic beverage market.75
IV. IHSA v. GTE
IHSA is the sponsor of the annual Illinois high school basketball
tournament.76 The tournament is held every year in March and is
sometimes broadcast on television to a nationwide audience. 77 Since
the early 1940s, IHSA has used the trademark "March Madness" to
designate the annual basketball tournament.78 IHSA has licensed the
use of the "March Madness" trademark on merchandise associated
with the Illinois high school basketball tournament.79
The National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") also
holds its annual basketball tournament in the month of March.80 In
1982, when CBS began televising the NCAA's "Final Four"
championship games, CBS broadcaster Brent Musburger used the
term "March Madness" to designate the games. 81 The term caught
on, and became used by the public to denote the NCAA's basketball
tournament as well as IHSA's tournament.82
In 1993 or 1994, the NCAA began licensing the use of the term
"March Madness" to producers of products related to the NCAA
tournament.83 Defendant GTE Vantage, Inc. ("Vantage") licensed
the term and began using "March Madness" to promote a computer
game it calls "NCAA Championship Basketball." 84 The term "March
Madness" appears on the packaging in which the game is sold and in
some of the game's computer graphics.85
72. See id. at 949.
73. See id.
74. Id. at 950.
75. See id. at 958-59.
76. See IHSA v. GTE, 99 F.3d 244, 245 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1083
(1997).
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id
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IHSA sought injunctive relief under section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act,86 arguing that it should be awarded relief under a reverse
confusion theory.s7  IHSA contended that consumers would be
confused by the NCAA licensees' use of "March Madness" and think
that IHSA's use of its own trademark was either sponsored by the
NCAA, infringed the NCAA's "trademark rights" in "March
Madness," or simply directly referred to the NCAA's basketball
tournament.88
Chief Judge Posner, writing for a three-judge panel, began by
stating that the issue of reverse confusion or any other type of
confusion does not arise until after it is determined that IHSA has a
protectable trademark.8 9 Judge Posner then noted that it had been
fourteen years since the media first appropriated the term "March
Madness" to describe the NCAA tournament, and that IHSA "was
not assiduous" in protecting its trademark. 90
The court accepted that "March Madness" had not become a
generic term, i.e. "March Madness" is not the name of basketball
tournaments or any other event in general. 91 However, the court
held, in this "novel issue of trademark law,"92 that since "March
Madness" had become affixed to both the NCAA's and IHSA's
tournaments, IHSA no longer had a protectable trademark in the
"dual-use" term. The rationale and rule stated by the court was that
"for the sake of protecting effective communication... dual-use or
multiple-use terms" should be "assimilated" to generic terms.93
Judge Posner focused on two points in particular in deciding the
issue. First, he pointed out that it was the media, and not the NCAA
or Vantage who was responsible for eradicating the exclusive
association of "March Madness" with I-SA.94 The court emphasized
that "a trademark is not nearly so secure an entitlement as a property
right.., and dies when it ceases to designate [a source], for whatever
reason other than the culpable conduct of the defendant." 95 Thus
86. For the text of Lanham Act section 43(a), see supra note 10.
87. See IHSA, 99 F.3d at 246.
88. Id.; see also supra Part Ii (discussing the types of consumer confusion engendered
in a reverse confusion scenario).
89. For a discussion of the two elements plaintiff must prove in order to prevail on a
claim of trademark infringement, see supra Part II.
90. IHSA, 99 F.3d at 246 ("A serious trademark holder is assiduous in endeavoring to
convince dictionary editors, magazine and newspaper editors, journalists and columnists,
judges, and other lexicographically influential persons to avoid using his trademark to
denote anything other than the trademarked good or service.")
91. See idU at 247.
92. Id. at 245.
93. I& at 247.
94. See id. at 246-47 (media "appropriated" the term "March Madness").
95. Id. at 246.
November 1998] "MIARCHNMADNSS"
since it was the media, and not the NCAA or Vantage, who initially
caused the confusion, IHSA had no remedy. Second, Judge Posner
sought to protect the public's interest in "effective communication. '96
Since the public had a dual association with the term "March
Madness," IHSA was "not allowed to withdraw from the public
domain a name that the public is using to denote someone else's good
or service, leaving that someone and his customers speechless. '97
Because of the above considerations, the court determined that IHSA
did not have a trademark that the law would protect.
V. Proposal
In this section, this Note examines the implications of the holding
in IHSA v. GTE and proposes that dual-use terms should be
recognized as protectable trademarks.98 Dual-use terms present too
many conflicting interests for a bright line test such as that applied to
generic terms to be workable. This approach will provide a level of
trademark protection that is consistent with the goals of trademark
law, while still addressing Judge Posner's concerns regarding
"effective communication" and the distinctions between media and
non-media causes of consumer confusion.
At the outset, however, notice that the fact that IIHSA was "not
assiduous" in protecting its trademark is not a factor in considering
whether dual-use terms should receive greater protection than
generic terms. Judge Posner notes that a "serious trademark holder"
would endeavor to "supplicate" and convince all "lexicographically
influential persons," such as editors and journalists, to avoid using its
trademark in a confusing manner.99  But as the opinion later
acknowledges, whether IHSA has been diligent in defending its
trademark "is in fact irrelevant,"'1' because the fundamental inquiry
remains unchanged. If IHSA's trademark was converted into a dual-
use term, should that term no longer receive any trademark
protection?' 01
96. ld. at 247.
97. Id
98. I.e. it should at least be possible for dual-use terms to satisfy step one of trademark
infringement analysis-that there is a mark that merits protection.
99. Id. at 246.
100. Id.
101. Note that in cases of reverse confusion, "supplication" of the junior user, whose
intention is to leverage its greater resources to gain a competitive advantage, is most likely
futile without the assurance that the senior user will be able to enforce its rights in the
mark.
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A. Implications of Assimilating Dual-Use Terms to Generic Terms
When the typical pattern of reverse confusion is examined, as in
the Bigfoot case,1°2 where the public is confused as to whether
"Bigfoot" tires come from the senior user, Big 0, or the larger junior
user, Goodyear, what emerges is a pattern that will inevitably create a
"dual association" in the minds of the public. When the economically
stronger junior user employs the senior's trademark, some, probably
most, of the relevant consumers will come to associate the senior's
mark with the junior user. Since reverse confusion will create a dual-
use term, a blanket rule stating that dual-use terms should be treated
as generic terms and afforded no protection provides no protection
against reverse confusion infringement. 0 3
The IHSA court did suggest that "were the NCAA responsible
for blotting out [IHSA's trademark] . . . IHSA might have a
remedy."'' 4 In that scenario, the court would seemingly find that
IHSA satisfied the first element of trademark infringement, i.e., that
IHSA had a trademark the law would protect. Then, the court would
analyze the second element, i.e., whether there is a likelihood of
confusion. However, if the effect of reverse confusion is to create a
dual-use term, and dual-use terms are not protectable marks,
potential victims of reverse confusion infringement such as IHSA
would never advance past the first element of the infringement
analysis since they would own a non-protectable dual-use term. The
effect would be that "anyone with adequate size and resources can
adopt any trademark and develop a new meaning for that trademark
as identification of the second user's products."'0 5
Yet every circuit that has considered the question of whether to
provide a remedy for reverse confusion infringement has answered in
the affirmative. 1°6 These courts have recognized that providing a
remedy for reverse confusion furthers the twin goals of the Lanham
Act-to prevent consumer confusion as to the source of goods and
services and to protect the trademark owner's goodwill and ability to
distinguish his goods.'t 7 As noted earlier in Part MI(A), the case for
providing protection may be especially compelling in a case of reverse
confusion, since the senior user may come to be seen as the
102. See Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365 (10th
Cir. 1977).
103. See Roundup of Recent Developments, 3 No. 3 INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST 9, 12
(1996) (IHSA v. GTE's holding "renders the doctrine of 'reverse confusion' a virtual
nullity.").
104. 99 F.3d at 246-47.
105. See Big 0, 561 F.2d at 1372 (quoting Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 408 F. Supp 1219,1236 (D. Colo. 1975)).
106. See Long & Marks, supra note 55, at 4.
107. See supra Part I (discussing the goals of the Lanham Act).
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infringer.10 8 Adopting the rule of IHSA v. GTE, then, eliminates
protection for reverse confusion claims, and would be inconsistent
with the stated goals of federal trademark law.
B. Toward a More Balanced Approach to Dual-Use Terms
Some commentators have described the equities underlying
trademark law as vectors that all point in the same direction in a
simple case, but which can become a "collection of vectors which
point in different directions."'1 9 This is true when a court is faced
with a dual-use term or a reverse confusion case, and an unyielding
rule that all dual-use terms receive no protection cannot adequately
address all of the conflicting interests involved.
A recent case which addressed the holding from IHSA v. GTE is
Dream Team Collectibles, Inc. v. NBA Properties, Inc.110 Plaintiff
Dream Team Collectibles ("DTC") alleged that defendant NBA
Properties, Inc.'s ("NBAP") use of DTC's trademark "Dream Team"
in connection with the 1992 and 1996 Olympic basketball teams
created "reverse confusion.""' Defendant NBAP began using the
"Dream Team" mark after a 1991 Sports Illustrated cover featured a
photograph of five star players of the Olympic under the headline
"DREAM TEAM."" 2  Defendant NBAP cited IHSA v. GTE to
support the proposition that since widespread use of "Dream Team"
had created a dual association among consumers, DTC no longer had
a protectable trademark." 3 Judge Stohr, perhaps sensing that the
broad rule of IHSA v. GTE was problematic, rejected NBAP's
motion for summary judgment and read IHSA v. GTE to apply only
when it is undisputed that the media has created the confusion." 4
Judge Stohr's ruling in Dream Team preserves the means to deal
with the larger "bully newcomer" in a reverse confusion scenario by
making a distinction between media and non-media causes of
confusion. Yet it should not matter whether a powerful junior user
decides to appropriate a smaller senior user's trademark before,
simultaneously with, or after the actions of the media. The confusion,
and thus the injury to the public interest, remains in each situation.
There may be situations where it would be proper to impose liability
on a junior user even though that junior user began to use the senior's
108. See Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 958 (7th Cir.
1992).
109. Long & Marks, supra note 55, at 2.
110. 958 F. Supp. 1401 (E.D. Mo. 1997).
111. Id- at 1404.
112- See id. at 1406 (the players were National Basketball Association stars Magic
Johnson, Michael Jordan, Charles Barkley, Patrick Ewing, and Karl Malone).
113. See id. at 1409.
114. Id at 1410.
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mark after the media has already begun to do so.
For example, one can imagine situations where the junior user
was a factor in the media's use of the senior's mark, or
opportunistically capitalized on media action that had only heretofore
created limited "dual-association" in the public. The junior user
would escape even partial liability under these circumstances if it is
found that the media technically "caused" the confusion. Under the
rationale of Dream Team, IHSA v. GTE would then apply and the
senior user would be left with an unprotectable dual-use term. Note
further that the media, in using the trademark, would not be liable for
using it in a news program or even in advertising if the term were only
used for identification. 115 Thus a standard where the dispositive issue
is whether the media "caused" the confusion in many instances will
create an "all or nothing" situation for the plaintiff, since a finding
that the media caused the confusion will preclude any remedy
regardless of the relative culpability of the junior user. The more
flexible standard suggested in this Note would be better able to
accommodate these situations. A bright line distinction between
media and non-media causes of confusion would produce inequitable
results in these scenarios.
And it is to the equities that one should look. Dual-use terms
should be recognized as protectable trademarks. The equitable and
First Amendment considerations that arise from possible protection
of dual-use terms can be addressed by fashioning a proper remedy."i 6
Of course, a plaintiff would still have to prove likelihood of confusion
to warrant receiving a remedy, and all trademark defenses such as
laches and unclean hands are still available to the defendant to defeat
the plaintiff's claim."17 The suggested approach would be better able
to balance the various "vectors" of conflicting interests and reach
equitable results.
For example, where the great majority of the public uses the
senior's trademark to denote the junior's products, the court will have
First Amendment concerns in vindicating the senior's trademark
115. See IHSA v. GTE, 99 F.3d 244, 246 (7th Cir. 1996), cerL denied, 117 S. Ct. 1083
(1997) (citing L.L. Bean Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987); New
Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing Inc., 971 F.2d 302,308 (9th Cir. 1992)).
116. See Robert C. Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights: An Analysis of the
Merchandising of Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C. L. REV 603, 613 (1984) ("There is of
course an alternative. Qualified injunctions permitting continued use of names or symbols
under specified conditions can redress confusion while minimizing anticompetitive
consequences."); Long & Marks, supra note 55, at 32 ("courts should consider whether
there are remedies which ameliorate a harsh winner-take-all result").
117. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, §§ 31:1-31:160 for a discussion of the various
defenses available.
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rights. A qualified injunction" 8 such as a disclaimer or a geographic
prohibition may address the conflicting concerns. For more egregious
violations by the junior user, even where injunctive relief is not
practical," 9 remedies such as a reasonable royalty 20 and remedial
advertisingl2l may serve to preserve freedom of expression, prevent
defendant from obtaining unjust profits, and provide some relief for
the obliteration of plaintiff's trademark. Similarly, whether the media
created the confusion now becomes but one factor in the analysis and
is no longer dispositive. The court could still choose to deny relief
when it appears the defendant has done no wrong.122 That a mark is
protectable does not mean that it will be protected in every instance.
Finally, although the court in IHSA v. GTE was rightly
concerned with "effective communication" in the context of dual-use
terms, that cannot be the justification for a rule providing dual-use
terms with no protection, since there are less restrictive means of
addressing this concern. As shown above, a more balanced and
equitable approach is possible by recognizing that dual-use terms are
entitled to trademark protection and fashioning a remedy according
to the equities involved. Dual use terms simply present too many
conflicting interests for a bright line test such as that applied to
generic terms to be workable. This treatment of dual-use terms
would provide a greater number of satisfactory outcomes due to its
flexibility and ability to address the competing concerns.
Conclusion
There are many conflicting interests involved when fashioning a
rule of trademark protection. In the context of IHSA v. GTE,
conflicts between the interests of the trademark owner, the
underlying goals of trademark law, the public's interest in effective
communication, and the public's freedom from confusion constitute
different vectors of equity, each pulling a different direction. A hard
rule of decision regarding dual-use terms, such as that offered in
IHSA v. GTE, cannot effectively address the conflicting interests
involved. Rather, a rule recognizing dual-use terms as protectable
11. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 30:3, for a discussion of balancing the equities
via a qualified injunction.
119. See, e.g., IHSA, 99 F.3d at 247 (IHSA would not have an injunctive remedy since
granting injunctive relief would promote "more confusion.").
120. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 30:85 (stating that a reasonable royalty is a more
workable measure of damages than an accounting of profits).
121. See id., §§ 30:80-30:84, for a discussion and criticism of corrective advertising
awards.
122. This would appear to be the case with defendant Vantage. Thus the result of
IHSA v. GTE would likely be the same under the proposed framework.
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marks would maintain the protections courts have installed for
reverse confusion infringement, more effectively deal with the
conflicting interests, and protect the goals underlying trademark
protection and the Lanham Act.

